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Research has shown that very young children have the ability to solve difficult division 
problems before formal school-based instruction. This is accomplished by solving sharing-based 
division word problems by an interesting act known as 'dealing'. The theory set forth in this 
manuscript is that children's ability to solve sharing-based division problems is due to an evolved 
psychological structure expressed as a dealing action. This structure may have been shaped by an 
ancient ecology, which pressured human ancestors to cooperatively share food in order to survive, 
and contributed to the emergence of formal mathematical division. This theory is supported by 
evidence of a specialized action for dealing to solve sharing-based division problems, a pancultural 
ability for young children to solve the problems, children's lack of consciousness while solving the 
problems, development from dealing to a mental model, evidence of evolved quantitative abilities 
in humans and animals, food sharing behaviors in humans and capuchin monkeys, and egalitarian 
abilities. The discussion section includes: a possible scenario for the development of the structure; 
an illustration of how the structure can be used in the elementary classroom; and empirical 
questions which may lead to a better understanding of food sharing habits, ecology, and sociology 
of early humans. 
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Research over the past three decades has shown that children can solve 
difficult division problems before second grade without formal educational 
instruction (Carpenter, Ansell, Franke, Fennema, & Weisbeck, 1993; Carpenter, 
Fennema, Franke, Levi, & Empson, 1999; Clements & Lean, 1988; Davis & 
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Pitkethly, 1990; Empson, 2001; Frydman & Bryant, 1988; Hunting & Davis, 1991; 
Hunting & Sharpley, 1988). The division problems that young children can solve 
are not in the form of or with the use of the traditional algorithm or symbolic 
notation; but particular division word problems that are solved by an act that 
resembled sharing and is called dealing (Correa, Nunes, & Bryant, 1998; Davis & 
Pitkethly, 1990; Hunting & Davis, 1991). Researchers are puzzled by this 
interesting phenomenon and attribute the ability to informal knowledge (Mack, 
1998), equivalence-reasoning strategies (Empson, 2001), and unlearned strategies 
(Pepper, 1991). It is believed that this unexplained ability may be the basis for 
learning formal division (Carpenter, Fennema, & Franke, 1996) and could explain 
other mathematical abilities (Pepper & Hunting, 1998; Squire & Bryant, 2002a). 
Multiple conjectures for the origin of the ability to divide have been proposed 
(Pepper & Hunting, 1998). Frydman and Bryant (1988) and Hunting and Davis 
(1991) believe that it is learned from others, Correa et al. (1998) state that it is an 
action schema tied to sharing, Riess (1955) claims it arises developmentally 
through experiences, and Ansari (2008) states some mathematical abilities may 
have been shaped by natural selection. These conjectures are the furthest 
explanations for why children can solve difficult sharing-based division problems 
before second grade without formal educational instruction. This surprising void in 
the literature is probably due to the necessary interdisciplinary nature of the 
argument, and the lack of evidence for how children solve sharing-based division 
problems. Fortunately, new evidence on the origin of evolved psychological 
structures and how children solve sharing-based division problems has shed light 
on the topic; therefore, a coherent theory can now be formed. The theory set forth 
in this manuscript is that children's ability to solve sharing-based division problems 
is an expression of an evolved psychological structure for dealing. This structure 
may have been shaped by an ancient ecology, which pressured human ancestors to 
cooperatively share food in order to survive, and contributed to the emergence of 
formal mathematical division.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework: Evidence for an Evolved Psychological Number 
Structure 
 
Implicit Knowledge and Number Sense 
 
Evolved psychological structures are knowledge, abilities, or competencies 
(Geary, 2005) rooted in specialized brain circuits. The structures are believed to be 
encoded in our genome, inherited much like physical evolved structures (i.e., 
adaptive traits), and shaped by recurring past social or ecological problems. The 
best evidence that these structures exist is specific behaviors, which occur when 
extant organisms face particular social or ecological cues. These structures extract 
one type of specific information from the environment through the senses, and 
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respond quickly, automatically, and unconsciously. Humans often have difficulty in 
accurately describing what promoted the response (Geary, 2005). It has been 
hypothesized that these structures were, and sometimes continue to be, 
advantageous to the individual and the population. It is further hypothesized that 
many of these structures have been co-opted by culture and built upon to form 
academic disciplines and concepts (Ansari, 2008; Geary, 1995, 2005). 
Many propose that humans have an evolved psychological structure for 
number (number structure hereafter) which enables an individual to categorize the 
world in terms of numerosities and their relationships (Ansari, 2008; Butterworth, 
1999; De Cruz, 2006; Dehaene, 1997; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 
1998; Geary, 1995). This structure was probably important for survival and was 
involved in foraging decisions or determining numerosities of predators (Ansari, 
2008). Specifically, this structure gives one number sense, or the ability, within 
limits, to individuate the numerosities in a collection, instantaneously count or 
estimate numerosities in a collection (called subitizing), match the numerosities of 
one collection based on one-to-one correspondences between count-words and the 
objects being counted, explain which of two collections is larger, enumerate 
collections, and recognize changes in numerosities within collections (Butterworth, 
1999; Geary, 1995). 
 
Number Sense in Infants 
 
Several studies have tested infants' number sense and found that they are 
sensitive to numerosities (Starkey, 1992; Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1991), 
recognize visual differences in continuous (e.g., length and area) and discontinuous 
(e.g., number of dots) variables (McCrink & Wynn, 2004), recognize differences 
between auditory syllables and tones (Bijeljac-Babic, Bertoncini, & Mehler, 1993; 
Starkey & Gelman, 1983; vanMarle & Wynn, 2002) and can conduct simple 
arithmetic (McCrink & Wynn, 2004; Wynn, 1992). Newborns can recognize 
numerosities up to three within the first weeks of life (Antell & Keating, 1983) and 
can represent numerosities up to three or four exactly, but fail at recognizing 
differences between higher numerosities (De Cruz, 2006). Since infants have the 
ability to disregard the modality of presentation (i.e., visually and auditorily), yet 
hold a sensitivity to numerosities, it is believed that the representation is abstract 





Adult, infant, and animal neuroimaging studies have provided additional 
evidence for a number structure (De Cruz, 2006). Overwhelming evidence shows 
that arithmetic facts and calculation procedures are stored in the parietal lobe 
(Rickard et al., 2000), and numerous adult studies have determined the 
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intrapariental sulcus (IPS) may be the center of number processing and visuospatial 
attention (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Fias, 
Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban, 2003). Eger, Sterzer, Russ, Giraud, and 
Kleinschmidt (2003) found that the IPS is activated when subjects are presented 
with both visual and auditory Arabic digits, whereas letters presented in the same 
fashions did not elicit a response. Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, and Tsivkin 
(1999) found that the IPS, and not cerebral circuits associated with language, was 
activated when subjects were asked to use approximate calculations to answer 
various types of mathematics problems. It is believed that these neural circuits may 
contain neurons that are sensitive to numerosities. Nieder and Miller (2004) found 
that when trained rhesus monkeys were shown dots of various sizes, shapes, and 
colors, specific individual neurons were only activated when changes to the number 
of dots were presented. These individual neurons were activated by particular 
numerosities, and decreased in activation as the numerosities increased or 
decreased. Certain cells in the parietal-occipital cortex of cats behaved similarly, 
and selectively responded to tactile, auditory, and visual numerosities (Thompson, 
Mayers, Robertson, & Patterson, 1970).  
 
Number Sense Deficits 
 
Since the number structure is biological and inherited, it may fail to develop 
normally in some and can be impaired by disease and brain trauma in others 
(Butterworth, 1999). Developmental disorders include developmental dyscalculia, 
which affects children with normal intelligence and causes difficulty in calculation 
and mental arithmetic (Price, Holloway, Rasanen, Vesterinen, & Ansari, 2008). 
The IPS activity in children with developmental dyscalculia is disrupted during 
certain mathematical tasks (Fias et al., 2003), and is absent in others (Price et al., 
2007). Recent studies show that children with developmental dyscalculia were 
found to have less grey matter in the left (Isaacs, Edmonds, Lucas, & Gadian, 
2001), and right IPS (Rotzer et al., 2008). Lesions caused by disease to the parietal 
lobes can impair internal representations of numerosities (Takayama, Sugishita, 
Akiguchi, & Kimura, 1994; Warrington, 1982) and number processing 
impairments, which render one without an ability to comprehend, produce, and 
calculate numbers (Dehaene et al., 1998). Examples of extreme impairment due to 
damage to this region of the brain have left subjects without the ability to subitize 
two dots; determine if the numeral 5 is larger or smaller than the numeral 10; or 
remember one's home address, age, or shoe size (Butterworth, 1999). Virtual 
lesions can be created by using transcranial magnetic stimulation to stimulate the 
right parietal lobe, which in turn, hinders automatic processing in adults (Cohen 
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Numerosities in Animals 
 
If a number structure is encoded in our genome, we may be able to trace it 
back through our evolutionary history and find evidence of it in extant organisms 
(Butterworth, 1999). Decades of animal studies show that certain organisms have a 
latent capacity to perform certain numerical tasks (Butterworth, 1999; Gallistel, 
1990). Evidence of sensitivity to numerosities among other number sense has been 
found in the African grey parrot (Pepperberg, 1987), domestic cat (Thompson et al., 
1970), common chimpanzee (Boysen, 1993), rhesus monkey (Hauser, Carey, & 
Hauser, 2000), lion (McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994), and red-back salamander 
(Uller, Jaeger, Guidry, & Martin, 2003). Other mathematical abilities have been 
studied in invertebrates such as the honey bee and digger wasp (Gallistel, 1990; 
Gould, 1986).  
There are evolutionary adaptive advantages for numerical abilities in animals. 
Environmental characteristics that contain information, and often vital information, 
can exert selective pressures on animal nervous systems (De Cruz, 2006). 
Therefore, a number structure could reduce multiple complex inputs, like objects or 
events in time and space, to simple numerical relationships (De Cruz, 2006). For 
example, it is advantageous for animals to have an ability to compare two 
collections of food in environments where food is scare, and to determine which is 
greater. This ability would improve an organism's fitness in its environment, 
therefore, improving its chances for survival and reproduction. Animal studies have 
shown that some organisms use numerical cues to make foraging decisions (Hauser 
et al., 2000; Uller et al., 2003), some compare the number of individuals in their 
group to others in order to determine whether to attack the group (McComb et al., 
1994), and some use auditory numerosities to communicate to others within their 
group (Boesch, 1996).  
 
 
Evolved Psychological Structure for Dealing 
 
Dealing and Children 
 
Since the capacity to divide through sharing manifests at an early age, the 
ability seems to be automatic and unconscious (Davis & Pitkethly, 1990), and 
children are proficient at it (Frydman & Bryant, 1988; Squire & Bryant, 2002b); the 
ability may be attributed to an evolved psychological structure. Evolved 
psychological structures, like the number structure, can be expressed through 
abilities, knowledge, or competencies (Geary, 2005). The ability which is expressed 
through this proposed evolved psychological structure is called dealing. Davis and 
Pitkethly (1990) define dealing as a ''…cyclic distribution of discrete objects 
(regarded as identical), with the same number distributed to each place on each 
round of the cycle until there are none left [p. 145].'' Children use this ability, which 
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resembles the dealing of playing cards, to solve sharing-based division problems 
(Correa et al., 1998; Davis & Pitkethly, 1990; Hunting & Davis, 1991). 
If an evolved psychological structure is encoded in our genome and inherited, 
then the ability to solve sharing-based division problems through dealing should be 
found panculturally. This seems to be the case. For example, Hunting and Sharpley 
(1988) found that 206 English-speaking Australian children who did not have 
traditional educational instruction in division, successfully allocated 12 items to 
three dolls 60% of the time, and 75 four and five year olds allocated 12 crackers to 
two dolls 77% of the time. Correa et al. (1998) observed the dealing ability in five 
year old English-speaking children in England when solving sharing-based division 
problems. Empson (1999) and Mack (1993) found that first grade and fifth grade 
American children successfully used the ability to solve sharing-based division 
problems in a classroom setting. 
Children in isolated tribes, where there is little contact with other groups 
which could culturally transmit the ability and knowledge, can successfully solve 
sharing-based division problems through dealing (Butterworth, Reeve, Reynolds, & 
Lloyd, 2008). Researchers studied 45 children between the ages of four and seven. 
Monolinguistic speaking children of two Australian languages (Warlpiri and 
Anindilyakwa), that lacked counting words, were tested on numerical concepts 
against English speaking indigenous Australian children. An enumeration task was 
used to test number sense understanding which included the sharing of multiple, 
equal-sized, three-centimeter disks. The children were asked a division problem in 
which children shared the disks among three toy bears. In four randomly-ordered 
trials, children were given six, seven, nine, and ten disks. The results of the 
experiment showed that nearly all the children tested were able to successfully 
share six or nine items among three bears. Similarly, both groups of children were 
less successful sharing seven and ten disks among the bears. The researchers 
concluded that the findings could be explained by an inherent mathematical ability 
(Butterworth et al., 2008).  
The ability to solve sharing-based division problems by dealing is automatic, 
unconscious, and difficult for the individual to accurately describe what promoted 
the response (Davis & Pitkethly, 1990; Frydman & Bryant, 1988). The social cue, 
which is often and successfully used in the classroom setting (e.g., Empson, 1999, 
2001; Empson, Junk, Dominguez, & Turner, 2005), occurs when one is asked to 
share x items to y individuals (Correa et al., 1998). As with other evolved 
psychological structures which are automatic and unconscious, children only have 
an implicit knowledge of when to deal. The unconscious act of dealing is not the 
same as the conscious understanding of division. In other words, children do not 
understand the relationship between the dividend, divisor, and quotient (Correa et 
al., 1998). In fact, Davis and Pitkethly (1990) discovered that when preschool 
children used dealing to solve sharing-based division problems, they were often not 
aware that they dealt the same amount to each individual. The children had to count 
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the shared items that each individual received, and used counting as an essential 
part of solving the problem as opposed to a method of checking. Mathematics 
educators are aware that this and other automatic, unconscious abilities may 
actually interfere with an understanding of mathematics. Therefore, these abilities, 
like any other misconceptions/alternative conceptions, are to be used as starting 
points to teaching mathematical concepts. 
 
From Dealing to Formal Mathematical Division 
 
Some evolved cognitive structures are co-opted by culture, and built upon to 
create formal academic topics and academic disciplines (Geary, 1995, 2005). The 
work of Squire and Bryant (2003; also see 2002a, 2002b) seems to demonstrate that 
dealing is a primitive form of formal mathematical division; that is, children's 
implicit knowledge moves beyond the simpler physical dealing of manipulatives 
(e.g., crackers, disks, food) to a model of active mental dealing. This significant 
research was based on the distinction of the two types of division word problems 
which appear in real life scenarios: partitive and quotitive. Partitive division is a 
problem type in which one evenly shares the number of items in a collection (the 
dividend) to a known set of subcollections (the divisor), which yields a quotient 
(Greer, 1992). An example of a partitive division problem is: Lakeisha has 12 
buttons and wants to evenly share the buttons among three friends. How many 
buttons does each friend get? Quotitive division is a problem type in which one 
determines how many subcollections (the quotient) of a fixed size (the divisor) can 
be created from a collection (the dividend) (Greer, 1992). An example of a 
quotitive division problem is: Lakeisha has 12 buttons and wants to evenly share 
the buttons with her friends. If each friend receives three buttons, how many friends 
received buttons?  
Squire and Bryant (2003) devised an ingenious technique in which students 
could solve problems by either grouping by the divisor or quotient. If children had 
an understanding of the relationship between the divisor and the quotient, there 
should be no difference found between the problem types and children's use of 
grouping to solve the problem. This is because each of these problems has two 
separate correct outcomes and the children could correctly solve the problem by 
either grouping by the divisor or quotient. One hundred twenty-nine, five to eight 
years old children were presented with drawings of collections arranged in a grid 
pattern and were read either partitive or quotitive division problems. It was 
discovered that the children were more successful at solving partitive division 
problems that are grouped by the divisor versus the quotient, and the opposite when 
solving quotitive division problems.  
Squire and Bryant's (2003) study shows that children have a restricted model 
of sharing that mirrors how they would solve the problem by dealing. In other 
words, children solved the problems by mentally dealing, and not by an 
understanding of the relationship between the divisor and the quotient. The 
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internalization of dealing provides evidence that sharing-based division problems 
can develop into a mental model. This is significant because models, which 
quantitatively represent the behavior of a system, are formulated by mathematicians 
by reducing systems in the natural world. This study furthers the theory that action 
schemas, such as dealing, are the origin of children's understanding of mathematics 
operations (Correa et al., 1998).  
 
Food Sharing and the Evolution of Ape to Man 
 
An evolved psychological structure for dealing is supported by evidence of a 
specialized action by a particular cue, a pancultural ability in young children, 
children's lack of consciousness while solving problems, children's development 
from dealing to a mental model, and evidence of a number structure in humans and 
animals. These characteristics fit the description of an evolved psychological 
structure (Buss, 2004). If an evolved psychological structure for dealing does exist, 
and evolved psychological structures are believed to be shaped by past 
environments; then we must look into the past for a situation in which dealing, 
sharing, or a related ability solved an ongoing problem. Since humans are the only 
extant species that have all of the aforementioned characteristics of the evolved 
psychological structure for dealing, the structure had to come about during the 
evolution of ape to man. Anthropologists and paleontologists have listed many 
factors that may have contributed to the evolution of ape to man, and the theme of 
sharing, specifically food sharing, is prevalent in human evolution literature. Food 
sharing is found in every proposed theory for the evolution of ape to man as either a 
primary (Isaac, 1978; McGrew & Feistner 1992; Tanner, 1987) or secondary factor 
(Lovejoy, 1981; Parker & Gibson, 1979). Each theory contends that humans 
evolved in an egalitarian society where food was equally shared. Evidence of food 
sharing in early man includes large collections of tools alongside tool-scarred, 
mammal bones (Isaac, 1978); the study of food sharing behaviors of modern 
hunter-gathers; and food sharing behaviors in animals.  
The reason that the sharing of food is a theme in the evolution of ape to man is 
because the ability to share was a solution to a problem that occurred during this 
transition. Food sharing would have been tremendously advantageous because of 
the precarious nature of hunting. Hunting is an activity that does not always yield a 
kill, and modern hunter-gather societies, which provide the best evidence for the 
behavior of early man (Knauft, 1993), often return with no food to feed the group. 
For example, the modern hunter-gathers, the Ache of Paraguay, have a 40% chance 
of returning from a hunt empty-handed (Hill & Hawkes, 1983). However, when a 
hunter does bring back food; meat for example, it is best to share the meat because 
one can only eat so much of it. If the meat is not shared, it will spoil. Additionally, 
it often takes multiple hunters, working cooperatively, to hunt and kill game. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that hunters would share their food when they were 
successful. Food sharing is pervasive in modern hunter-gathers societies, has been 
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shown to reduce the chances of risk from starvation (Kaplan & Hill, 1985), and its 
benefits align with optimality analyses models (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994).  
 
Food Sharing in Nonhuman Primates 
 
Evolved structures, whether they are physical or psychological, or occur 
gradually or suddenly in deep time, can often be traced through homologous traits 
in common ancestors. Most food sharing behaviors seem to follow 
phylogenetically predictable lines (McGrew, 1992), and great ape and human 
infants seem to share homologous psychological structures (Bard, 1990; Mathieu, 
1982). However, these structures are often exhibited as different abilities and it is 
difficult to ascertain if the structures are homologous. For example, both children 
and apes experiment with object-force relations (Bard, 1990). Children experiment 
by throwing toys at a wall with varying forces while observing outcomes and 
internalizing relationships and models, just as young apes playfully hit one another 
with varying forces while observing the other's reaction (Bard, 1990). These 
seemingly interesting and pleasurable actions allow both humans and primates to 
understand the physical world, and how to interact with it.  
Some food sharing abilities are believed to be an expression of an evolved 
psychological structure, and food sharing behaviors have been observed in 
nonhuman primates and non-primates, but to various degrees and kinds. Lions, 
wolves, hyenas, mongooses, birds, and vampire bats are non-primates which 
participate in food sharing. The sharing does not use a dealing action, is not 
habitual or active, and usually takes the form of tolerate theft or scourging. Habitual 
food sharing has been observed in at least four primates: capuchins, chimpanzees, 
callitrichids, and orangutans. Capuchins actively share food with a partner, and 
seem to share food as opposed to more selfish options (de Waal, Leimgruber, & 
Greenberg, 2008). They have been observed actively sharing stone tools 
(Westergaard & Suomi, 1997) and artificial tokens with other capuchins 
(Westergaard, Liv, Chavanne, & Suomi, 1998). This has been observed in captivity 
and without the use of a dealing action. Chimpanzees often share food by tolerated 
scrounging, by which the parent allows the offspring to take the food leftovers 
(McGrew, 1992). Although they do not seem to actively share edible food with 
each other, they do actively transfer nonfood items (Celli, Tomonaga, Udono, 
Teramoto, & Nagano, 2006). This has been observed in captivity through the active 
sharing of plastic pins, metal brushes, plastic spoons, other artificial items without a 
dealing action. Callitrichid sharing is active, without prompt, and occurs most often 
between parents and older siblings to infants, and less often between family 
members and the recipient mother or juvenile (McGrew, 1992). Orangutan mothers 
actively, but rarely, transfer food to their young, usually by breaking off a piece and 
putting it in the infant's mouth (Bard, 1990).  
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It is believed that the active sharing of food does not occur as often in 
nonhuman primates as it does in humans because sharing is less important for 
survival (McGrew, 1992), and there seems to be little need for it (de Waal, 1996). 
Interestingly, besides chimpanzees, capuchins are the only nonhuman primates to 
prey on large vertebrates (Rose, 1997), and meat is the only food that has been 
observed to be actively shared between adults in a naturalistic setting (Perry & 
Rose, 1994; Rose, 1997; Rose & Fedigan, 1995).  
In order to claim an extant nonhuman primate has an evolved psychological 
structure for dealing, two criteria must be met: a) the ability to deal food or a 
homologous ability, and b) a social or ecological cue which elicits the dealing 
action or homologous action. Of the four primates which habitually share food, the 
capuchin monkey best fits the criteria. The capuchin monkey is a new world ape of 
the genus Cebus, and shared a common ancestor with humans that lived over 25 
million years ago. The monkey has been observed raiding the nest of coati; a 
member of the raccoon family (Perry & Rose, 1994). Monkeys steal young coati 
pups and eat them alive, but they also tear off pieces of the pups and distribute them 
to begging monkeys within the group (de Waal, 1996). This observation is 
significant because the monkey actively offers food through an action similar to 
dealing, to multiple monkeys. However, researchers did not report that the 
distribution was cyclical or that it was repeated until there was no meat left. It is 
rare for non-human primates to share, especially by actively offering food with 
other adults and those outside of the parent-offspring context (de Waal, 2000).  
Simply tearing off pieces of carcass and distributing meat is not enough for the 
action to be related to the evolved psychological structure for dealing. There has to 
either be a social or ecological cue which elicits the homologous action; a cue 
similar to the oral cue used by individuals (e.g., teachers, researchers) so children 
can solve sharing-based division problems. It appears that capuchins will only 
actively share meat with beggars who use specific posture or vocalization, and 
interest in the meat (Brown, Almond, & van Bergen, 2004; Perry & Rose, 1994). 
The benefactors will actively set down the meat in front of the beggar (de Waal, 
1996). Under certain conditions, it has been found that the sharing is gratifying to 
the benefactor (de Waal et al., 2008). This begging cue and the sharing-based 
division problem could be one in the same. The instinct which follows the begging 
cue may be homologous to the instinct which is elicited when present-day humans 
give money to beggars (de Waal, 1996), allows for ''… food division [italics 
added]…'' (de Waal, 1996, p. 146), and the sharing of items by children to solve 
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Equality and Egalitarianism 
 
In order for sharing to take place, one must have the ability to quantify or 
measure an item against another item. For example, one must be able to compare 
the amount of one piece of meat to another piece and determine if the pieces are 
equal to one another. It is believed that equality and other egalitarian instincts came 
about in our human lineage as early humans were faced with environmental 
pressures. These pressures influenced the development of an instinct, which enables 
one to produce and quantify equal shares of a resource (Dunbar, 1997; Erdal & 
Whiten, 1994, 1997); the most important aspect of which was the ability to share 
food (de Waal, 1996; Ridley, 1996). In this society, an individual would have 
worked to get at least a share that is acceptable, equitable (Erdal & Whiten, 1994), 
and fair (Trivers, 1971). This instinct would have provided an advantage to certain 
individuals within the population and would have been selected for; therefore, 
increasing the population's fitness. This is because the individual who has the 
ability to detect whether one gets more than he is one who can realize if he has been 
cheated. If one does not have this ability, one may starve if food is scarce, while 
others would prosper from receiving larger, unequal shares. Numerous 
psychological studies have exhibited a pancultural human ability to detect when 
one has received an unequal share. Typical responses to another who has received a 
larger, unequal share are envy and jealousy (Tanaka, 1980). 
Human infants, rhesus monkeys, capuchins, and chimpanzees can quantify 
and compare continuous and discontinuous objects (Beran, 2004; Judge, Evans, & 
Vyas, 2005; vanMarle, Aw, McCrink, & Santos, 2006). Capuchins can compare 
and quantify continuous and discontinuous foods, and can choose the greater 
amount of food (vanMarle et al., 2006; vanMarle & Wynn, 2002). Interestingly, 
capuchins were found to compare and quantify continuous foods (e.g., yogurt 
raisins) as well as discontinuous foods (e.g., banana puree) (vanMarle et al., 2006). 
This is significant because it signals that human ancestors may have been able to 
quantify or measure an item against another item, regardless if it was continuous or 
discontinuous. Human ancestors who killed a large animal (a continuous food) 
could use the ability to tear the carcass into mostly equivalent pieces, and deal the 
meat to others (a discontinuous food).  
 
 
Discussion and Implications 
 
Research has shown that very young children have the ability to solve difficult 
division problems before formal school-based instruction. This is accomplished by 
solving sharing-based division word problems by an interesting act known as 
dealing. It has been asserted that dealing has its origins in sharing (Correa et al., 
1998; Dickson, Brown, & Gibson, 1984) and that the ability to quantify food may 
have shaped certain mathematical abilities (Ansari, 2008); however, a thorough 
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explanation for this ability has never been formulated. The theory set forth in this 
manuscript is that children's ability to solve sharing-based division problems is due 
to an evolved psychological structure expressed as a dealing action. This structure 
may have been shaped by an ancient ecology that pressured human ancestors to 
cooperatively share food in order to survive, and contributed to the emergence of 
formal mathematical division.  
The scenario for the origin of this ability and its contribution to formal 
mathematical division probably has an ancient phylogenetic history, and may have 
preceded the split of Old World monkeys and apes 25 million years ago. It may 
have unraveled as follows: a group of human-capuchins ancestors existed in a 
nonegalitarian social structure in an environment with a scare food supply. Despite 
the social structure, the individuals had the ability to hunt and kill large vertebrates 
and distribute meat like extant capuchin monkeys. This organism, like many extant 
organisms, also had primitive sensitivity to numerosities, could reduce multiple 
complex inputs to simple numerical relationships, and could compare and 
determine which of two collections of meat were greater. Unlike extant nonhuman 
primates who have little need to share food, the scarce food supply created an 
ecological pressure in which sharing of meat was advantageous to the population. 
This is believed to be true because the ability to share food probably would have 
never come about if the pressure was not present, and explains why most primates 
do not share food as often as humans (de Waal, 1996; McGrew, 1992). A complex 
interplay between a selfish need for meat and other resources versus an egalitarian 
instinct, which included the ability to share, were about to be fought (Erdal & 
Whiten, 1994). The result was the present competing human psychological instincts 
which include the motivation to dominate others versus not to dominate, and to 
share food versus not to share (Erdal & Whiten, 1994). These same instincts, 
although to lesser degrees, seem to be present in capuchins (de Waal, 2000; de 
Waal & Davis, 2003).  
An action for the sharing of food to others, which is found in human, 
capuchins, and other nonhuman primates, was selected for and shaped an action 
known as dealing. The dealing of food to others was necessary due to the multiple 
individuals that had to be fed and provided the most parsimonious manner in which 
to equally distribute food. Once again, this ability seems to be found in capuchin 
monkeys but to a lesser degree. Individuals who had the ability to share food 
through dealing only shared with others who had this same egalitarian instinct. This 
is because these individuals had an ability in which one could recognize fairness 
and whether one was being cheated or not. This improved the individual group 
member's fitness because of the precarious nature of hunting. Those group 
members who did not have this ability either starved when the food supply was 
scarce or when and if they continually returned from a hunt without food. As 
encephalization continued, the internalization of dealing was possible and sharing-
based division problems became a mental model. Present day Homo sapiens 
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continued to use sharing through dealing, which quantitatively represented the 
behavior of a deal, was co-opted by culture (i.e., exaptation), and was conceptually 
linked to the discipline of mathematics. The two types of sharing situation, which 
are an inverse to multiplication, were further reduced into the two multiplicative 
problems types known as partitive and quotitive division. These became the 
problems that children are presently successful at solving. From here, the problem 
types were further reduced by mathematicians to a theorem that could be solved 
with the traditional division algorithm. The mathematical symbols for division were 
created along with division-related terminology (i.e, dividend, divisor, quotient, 
etc.).  
Although the evolved psychological structure expressed as a dealing action is 
phylogenetically ancient, it is probably not as ancient as the number structure. This 
is because certain number structure abilities are necessary to fairly deal food to 
multiple individuals in a parsimonious manner. This includes the ability to: a) 
individuate the numerosities in a collection, b) instantaneously count or estimate 
numerosities in a collection, c) explain which of two collections is larger, d) 
enumerate collections, and e) recognize changes in numerosities within collections. 
However, one does not need the ability to match the numerosities of one collection 
based on one-to-one correspondences between count-words and the objects being 
counted. This means that the evolved psychological structure expressed as a dealing 
action could not have risen independently of the number structure, but was 
probably built upon it. In fact, it seems that certain aspects of the number structure 
are more phylogenetically ancient than others (Coolidge & Overmann, 2012).  
There are several limitations to this scenario and the theory put forth in this 
manuscript. This first, and most obvious alternative explanation, is that the evolved 
psychological structure expressed as a dealing action could be nothing more than a 
vestigial structure which once held a purpose other than sharing food. It could be, 
say, useful for dealing tools. The second is that the action may be a random 
behavior with no purpose for survival all; it may simply be a mutation or a 
byproduct of another structure. For example, bone tissue is white, but the color isn't 
important for survival. Lastly, and although highly unlikely, the evolved 
psychological structure expressed as dealing and the number structure may be 
products of convergent evolution. These structures' abilities may have come about 
multiple times throughout deep time, and are simply interpreted as being 
homologous (Ansari, 2008).  
Although children's ability to solve sharing-based division problems seems to 
be mathematically special, there is strong evidence for an evolutionary precursor 
for the operation of addition as well. The operation of addition requires mentally 
joining quantitative representations of numerosities. Infants seem to have this 
ability; many nonhuman primates do as well (Cantlon & Brannon, 2007). Evidence 
of this ability has been found in chimpanzees (Boysen & Berntson, 1989; Cantlon 
& Brannon, 2007), orangutans (Call, 2000), and rhesus monkeys (Flombaum, 
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Junge, & Hauser, 2005). Cantlon and Brannon (2007) concluded that addition 
performed by chimpanzees is similar to that of humans, and that it is part of a 
shared evolutionary primitive system. Once again, it seems that this operation is not 
as ancient as the number structure because the number structure's abilities are 
necessary to perform addition. 
An implication of this theory deals with the teaching of division in elementary 
schools. This theory furthers the argument that mathematics should be introduced 
with an understanding of students' prior knowledge (see National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics [NCTM], 2000; National Research Council, 2000). This 
means that students should be placed in a learning situation in which they can use 
this ability, and the teacher builds upon it, much like culture built upon the evolved 
psychological structure for dealing and the number structure. This is in opposition 
of how mathematical division is often introduced in schools today, in which the 
student is treated as a blank slate and explicitly taught the traditional algorithm with 
symbolic notation. Recent documents in US mathematics education have expressed 
the importance of prior knowledge in the teaching of mathematics in elementary 
school (see NCTM, 2000; National Mathematics Advisory Panel [NMAP], 2008). 
Principles and Standards for School Mathematics, the leading resource and guide 
for those who make decisions about the teaching and learning of K-12 mathematics 
education in the United States, states that children ''… must learn mathematics with 
understanding, actively building new knowledge from experience and prior 
knowledge (NCTM, 2000)''. The Final Report of the National Mathematics 
Advisory Panel (NMAP, 2008), a document, which outlines recommendations for 
stakeholders in US schools, states that ''… [m]ost children acquire considerable 
knowledge of numbers and other aspects of mathematics before they enter 
kindergarten … [and the]… mathematical knowledge that … [children]…bring to 
school is related to their mathematics learning …'' (NMAP, 2008, p. xviii). 
Therefore, the evolved psychological structure for sharing/dealing can be used as a 
launching point to introduce and teach mathematical division. 
An example lesson for the introduction of division for young children would 
appear as follows: The teacher passes out bags with three toy bear manipulatives 
and multiple small marshmallows to each student. The teacher asks the students to 
take out the bears and marshmallows, and to place the bears so that they face the 
student. The teacher tells the students that they will solve some sharing problems, 
and allows the students to work together to solve the problems. The teacher asks a 
partitive division problem, ''You have six marshmallows and want to evenly share 
them among the three bears. How many marshmallows does each bear get?'' The 
teacher provides time for the students to solve the problem. After the students finish 
solving the problem, they present their strategies and answers to the class. The 
teacher provides another more challenging problem by increasing the number of 
bears (divisor) or marshmallows (dividend). When the students finish multiple 
problems, the teacher introduces a formal mathematical number sentence, which 
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describes the operation. For example, 6÷3=2. This type of explicit instruction 
would help students formalize the dealing action into a mathematical model.  
There are multiple empirical questions that may be asked and 
recommendations for future study. If the theory set forth in this manuscript is 
correct, then it may be possible to empirically test the evolved psychological 
structure for dealing in young children to understand the food sharing habits, 
ecology, and sociology of early humans. This, of course, may be as misled as the 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny theory, yet it may lead to insights on food 
sharing questions that have eluded anthropologists and primatologists. Specific 
questions include: If the evolved psychological structure for dealing was formed 
around the sharing of meat, then would children be more proficient at dealing meat 
than other items (e.g., counters, coins, and marbles)? Can children deal to inanimate 
objects (i.e. bags, containers) as well as they do to individuals or 
anthropomorphized items (e.g., toy bears, dolls). Do children share the food at hand 
when others beg and do they use the dealing action? Do children use dealing in a 
naturalistic setting (e.g., outside of the classroom or lab), and if so, what is the cue 
to deal? Are children better at solving sharing-based division problems or problems 





Ansari, D. (2008). Effects of development and enculturation on number representation in the 
brain. Neuroscience, 9, 278-291.  
Antell, S.E., & Keating, D.P. (1983). Perception of numerical invariance in neonates. Child 
Development, 54, 695-701.  
Bard, K. (1990). "Social tool use" by free-ranging orangutans: A Piagetian and 
developmental perspective on the manipulation of an animate object. In S. Parker & K. 
Gibson (Eds.), Language and intelligence in monkeys and apes: Comparative 
developmental perspectives (pp. 356-378). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Beran, M.J. (2004). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) respond to nonvisible sets after one-by-
one addition and removal of items. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 25-36.  
Bijeljac-Babic, R., Bertoncini, J., & Mehler, J. (1993). How do 4-day-old infants categorize 
multisyllabic utterances? Developmental Psychology, 29(4), 711-721.  
Boesch, C. (1996). The question of culture. Nature, 379, 207-208.  
Boysen, S.T. (Ed.). (1993). Counting in chimpanzees: Nonhuman principles and emergent 
properties of number. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Boysen, S.T., & Berntson, G. (1989). Numerical competence in a chimpanzee (Pan 
troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 103(1), 23-31. 
Brown, G.R., Almond, R., & van Bergen, Y. (2004). Begging, stealing, and offering: Food 
transfer in nonhuman primates. Advances in the Study of Behavior, 34, 265-295.  
PSIHOLOGIJSKE TEME 23 (2014), 2, 243-263 
 
258 
Buss, D. (2004). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind (2nd ed.). Austin: 
Pearson. 
Butterworth, B. (1999). The mathematical brain. London: Macmillan. 
Butterworth, B., Reeve, R., Reynolds, F., & Lloyd, D. (2008). Numerical thought with and 
without words: Evidence from indigenous Australian children. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105(35), 13179-13184. 
Call, J. (2000). Estimating and operating on discrete quantities in Orangutans (Pongo 
pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 114(2), 136-147.  
Cantlon, J., & Brannon, E. (2007). Basic math in monkeys and college students. PLoS 
Biology, 5(12), 2912-2919. 
Carpenter, T.P., Ansell, E., Franke, M.L., Fennema, E., & Weisbeck, L. (1993). Models of 
problem solving: A study of kindergarten children's problem-solving processes. 
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 24, 427-440. 
Carpenter, T.P., Fennema, E., & Franke, M. (1996). Cognitively guided instruction: A 
knowledge base for reform in primary mathematics instruction. The Elementary 
School Journal, 97(1), 3-20. 
Carpenter, T.P., Fennema, E., Franke, M.L., Levi, L., & Empson, S.B. (1999). Children's 
mathematics: Cognitively guided instruction. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. 
Celli, M.L., Tomonaga, M., Udono, T., Teramoto, M., & Nagano, K. (2006). Spontaneous 
object sharing in captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 19, 439-446. 
Clements, M.A., & Lean, G.A. (1988). Discrete fraction concepts and cognitive structure. In 
A. Borbas (Ed.), Proceedings of the Twelfth annual Conference of the International 
Study Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education: Vol. 1, (pp. 215-222). 
Veszprem, Hungary: Hungarian National Centre for Education Technology 
Cohen Kadosh, R., Cohen Kadosh, K., Schuhmann, T., Kaas, A., Goebel, R., Henik A., & 
Sack, A. (2007). Virtual dyscalculia induced by parietal lobe TMS impairs automatic 
magnitude processing. Current Biology, 17, 689-693. 
Coolidge, F.L., & Overmann, K.A. (2012). Numerosity, abstraction, and the emergence of 
symbolic thinking. Current Anthropology, 53(2), 204-225. 
Correa, J., Nunes, T., & Bryant, P. (1998). Young children's understanding of division: The 
relationship between division terms in a noncomputational task. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 90(2), 321-329. 
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the 
invisible hand. The American Economic Review, 84(2), 327-332.  
Davis, G.E., & Pitkethly, A. (1990). Cognitive aspects of sharing. Journal for Research in 
Mathematics Education, 21(2), 145-153.  
De Cruz, H. (2006). Why are some numerical concepts more successful than others? An 
evolutionary perspective on the history of number concepts. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 27, 306-323. 
Cormas, P.C.: 
An Evolved Psychological Structure 
259 
Dehaene, S. (1997). The number sense. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dehaene, S., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., & Cohen, L. (1998). Abstract representations of 
numbers in the animal and human brain. Trends in Neuroscience, 1, 355-361. 
Dehaene, S., Piazza, M., Pinel, P., & Cohen, L. (2003). Three parietal circuits for number 
processing. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20, 487-506. 
Dehaene, S., Spelke, E., Pinel, P., Stanescu, R., & Tsivkin, S. (1999). Sources of 
mathematical thinking: Behavioral and brain-imaging evidence. Science, 284, 970-
974.  
de Waal, F.B.M. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and 
other animals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
de Waal, F.B.M. (2000). Attitudinal reciprocity in food sharing among brown capuchin 
monkeys. Animal Behaviour, 60, 253-261.  
de Waal, F.B.M., & Davis, J. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: Cooperation based on 
projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41, 221-228.  
de Waal, F.B.M., Leimgruber, K., & Greenberg, A.R. (2008). Giving is self-rewarding for 
monkeys. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 13685-13689. 
Dickson, L., Brown, M., & Gibson, O. (1984). Children learning mathematics: A teacher's 
guide to recent research. London: Cassel. 
Dunbar, R. (1997). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Eger, E., Sterzer, P., Russ, M.O., Giraud, A.L., & Kleinschmidt, A. (2003). A supramodal 
number representation in human intraparietal cortex. Neuron, 37, 1-20.  
Empson, S.B. (1999). Equal sharing and shared meaning: The development of fraction 
concepts in a first-grade classroom. Cognition and Instruction, 17, 283-343.  
Empson, S.B. (2001). Equal sharing and the roots of fraction equivalence. Teaching 
Children Mathematics, 7(7), 421-425. 
Empson, S.B., Junk, D., Dominguez, H., & Turner, E. (2005). Fractions as the coordination 
of multiplicatively related quantities: A cross-sectional study of children's thinking. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 63, 1-28.  
Erdal, D., & Whiten, A. (1994). On human egalitarianism: An evolutionary product of 
Machiavellian status escalation? Current Anthropology, 35(2), 175-178.  
Erdal, D., & Whiten, A. (1997). Egalitarianism and Machiavellian intelligence in human 
evolution. In P. Mellars & K. Gibson (Eds.), Models in the early human mind. 
Cambridge: Cambridge McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. 
Fias, W., Lammertyn, J., Reynvoet, B., Dupont, P., & Orban, G.A. (2003). Parietal 
representation of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 15, 1-11.  
Flombaum, J., Junge, J., & Hauser, M. (2005). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
spontaneously compute addition operations over large numbers. Cognition, 97, 315-
325. 
PSIHOLOGIJSKE TEME 23 (2014), 2, 243-263 
 
260 
Frydman, O., & Bryant, P.E. (1988). Sharing and the understanding of number equivalence 
by young children. Cognitive Development, 3, 323-339.  
Gallistel, C.R. (1990). The organization of learning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford 
Books. 
Geary, D. (1995). Reflections of evolution and culture in children's cognition: Implications 
for mathematical development and instruction. American Psychologist, 50(1), 24-37.  
Geary, D. (2005). The origin of mind: Evolution of brain, cognition, and general 
intelligence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Gould, J.L. (1986). The locale map of honey bees: Do insects have cognitive maps? Science, 
232, 861-863.  
Greer, B. (1992). Multiplication and division as models of situations. New York: 
MacMillan. 
Hauser, M.D., Carey, S., & Hauser, L.B. (2000). Spontaneous number representation in 
semi-free-ranging rhesus monkeys. Proceedings of the Royal Society London: 
Biological Sciences, 267, 829-833.  
Hill, K., & Hawkes, K. (1983). Neotropical hunting among the Ache of Eastern Paraguay. 
In R. Hames & W. Vickers (Eds.), In adaptive responses of native Amazonians (pp. 
139-188). New York: Academic Press. 
Hunting, R.P., & Davis, G. (1991). Dimensions of young children's conceptions of the 
fraction one half. In R.P. Hunting & G. Davis (Eds.), Early fraction learning (pp. 27-
53). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Hunting, R.P., & Sharpley, C.F. (1988). Preschoolers' cognitions of fractional units. British 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 58, 172-183. 
Isaac, G. (1978). Food sharing behaviors of protohuman hominids. Scientific American, 
238(4), 90-108.  
Isaacs, E.B., Edmonds, C.J., Lucas, A., & Gadian, D. (2001). Calculation difficulties in 
children of very low birth weight: A neural correlate. Brain, 124, 1701-1707.  
Judge, P.G., Evans, T.A., & Vyas, D.K. (2005). Ordinal representation of numeric quantities 
by brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Behavior Processes, 31, 79-94.  
Kaplan, H., & Hill, K. (1985). Food sharing among ache foragers: Tests of explanatory 
hypotheses. Current Anthropology, 26(2), 223-246.  
Knauft, B. (1993). South coast New Guinea cultures: History, comparison, dialectic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lovejoy, C. (1981). The origin of man. Science, 211, 341-350. 
Mack, N.K. (1993). Learning rational numbers with understanding: The case of informal 
knowledge. In T.P. Carpenter, E. Fennema, & T.A. Romberg (Eds.), Rational 
numbers: An integration of research (pp. 85-106). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Cormas, P.C.: 
An Evolved Psychological Structure 
261 
Mack, N.K. (1998). Building a foundation for understanding the multiplication of fractions. 
Teaching Children Mathematics, 5(1), 34-38. 
Mathieu, M. (1982, August). Intelligence without language: Piagetian assessment of 
cognitive development in chimpanzees. Paper presented at the Congress of the 
International Society of Primatology, Atlanta.  
McComb, K., Packer, C. & Pusey, A. (1994). Roaring and numerical assessment in contests 
between groups of female lions, Panthera leo. Animal Behavior, 47, 379-387.  
McCrink, K., & Wynn, K. (2004). Large-number addition and subtraction by 9-month-old 
infants. Psychological Science, 15(11), 776-781. 
McGrew, W.C. (1992). Chimpanzee material culture: Implications for human evolution. 
New York/Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
McGrew, W.C., & Feistner, A. (1992). Two nonhuman primate models for the evolution of 
human food sharing: Chimpanzees and callitrichids. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. 
Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of 
culture (pp. 229-241). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (2000). Principles and standards for school 
mathematics. Reston, VA. 
National Mathematics Advisory Panel (2008). Foundations for success: The final report of 
the national mathematics advisory panel. Washington, DC: United States Department 
of Education.  
National Research Council (2000). How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, and school. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Nieder, A., & Miller, E.K. (2004). A parieto-frontal network for visual numerical 
information in the monkey. PNAS, 101(19), 7457-7462. 
Parker, S., & Gibson, K. (1979). A developmental model for the evolution of language and 
intelligence in early hominids. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2, 367-408.  
Pepper, K.L. (1991). 'Preschoolers' knowledge of counting and sharing in discrete quantity 
settings. In R.P. Hunting & G. Davis (Eds.), Recent research in psychology: Early 
fraction learning (pp. 103-127). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Pepper, K.L., & Hunting, R. (1998). Preschoolers' counting and sharing. Journal for 
Research in Mathematics Education, 29(2), 164-184.  
Pepperberg, I.M. (1987). Evidence for conceptual quantitative abilities in the African grey 
parrot: Labeling of cardinal sets. Ethology, 75, 37-61.  
Perry, S., & Rose, L. (1994). Begging and transfer of coati meat by white-faced capuchin 
monkeys, Cebus capucinus. Primates, 35(4), 409-415.  
Price, G.R., Holloway, I., Rasanen, P., Vesterinen, M., & Ansari, D. (2007). Impaired 
parietal magnitude processing in developmental dyscalculia. Current Biology, 17(24), 
R1042-1043. 
Rickard, T.C., Romero, S.G., Basso, G., Wharton, C., Flitman, S., & Grafman, J. (2000). 
The calculating brain: An fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 38(3), 325-335.  
PSIHOLOGIJSKE TEME 23 (2014), 2, 243-263 
 
262 
Ridley, M. (1996). The origin of virtue. London: Viking. 
Riess, A.P. (1955). A new rationale for the teaching of fractions. Harvard Educational 
Review, 25, 105-125.  
Rose, L.M. (1997). Vertebrate predation and food-sharing in Cebus and Pan. International 
Journal of Primatology, 18(5), 727-765.  
Rose, L.M., & Fedigan, L.M. (1995). Vigilance in white-faced capuchins, Cebus capucinus, 
in Costa Rica. Animal Behaviour, 49, 63-70.  
Rotzer, S., Kucian, K., Martin, E., von Aster, M., Klaver, P., & Loenneker, T. (2008). 
Optimized voxel-based morphometry in children with developmental dyscalculia. 
Neuroimage, 39, 417-422.  
Squire, S., & Bryant, P. (2002a). The influence of sharing on children's initial concept of 
division. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 81, 1-43.  
Squire, S., & Bryant, P. (2002b). From sharing to dividing: Young children's understanding 
of division. Developmental Science, 5(4), 452-466.  
Squire, S., & Bryant, P. (2003). Children's models of division. Cognitive Development, 18, 
355-376.  
Starkey, P. (1992). The early development of numerical reasoning. Cognition, 43, 93-126.  
Starkey, P., & Gelman, R. (1983). Detection of intermodal numerical correspondences by 
human infants. Science, 222, 179-181. 
Starkey, P., Spelke, E.S., & Gelman, R. (1991). Toward a comparative psychology of 
number. Cognition, 39, 171-172.  
Takayama, Y., Sugishita, M., Akiguchi, I., & Kimura, J. (1994). Isolated acalculia due to 
left parietal lesion. Archives of Neurology, 52, 286-291.  
Tanaka, J. (1980). The san hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari: A study in ecological 
anthropology. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 
Tanner, N. (1987). The chimpanzee model revisited and the gathering hypothesis. In W. 
Kinzey (Ed.), The evolution of human behavior: Primate models (pp. 3-27). Albany: 
SUNY Press. 
Thompson, R.E., Mayers, K.S., Robertson, R.T., & Patterson, C.J. (1970). Number coding 
in association cortex of the cat. Science, 168, 271-273.  
Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 
46, 35-57.  
Uller, C., Jaeger, R., Guidry, G., & Martin, C. (2003). Salamanders (Plethodon cinereus) go 
for more: Rudiments of number in an amphibian. Animal Cognition, 6, 105-112. 
vanMarle, K., Aw, J., McCrink, K., & Santos, L. (2006). How capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) quantify objects and substances. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 120(4), 
416-426.  
vanMarle, K., & Wynn, K. (2002). Quantitative reasoning. Encyclopedia of cognitive 
science. Nature Publishing Group: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., England. 
Cormas, P.C.: 
An Evolved Psychological Structure 
263 
Warrington, E.K. (1982). The fractionation of arithmetical skills: A single case study. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34(1), 31-51.  
Westergaard, G.C., Liv, C., Chavanne, T.J., & Suomi, S.J. (1998). Token-mediated tool-use 
by a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Animal Cognition, 1, 101-106. 
Westergaard, G.C., & Suomi, S.J. (1997). Transfer of tools and food between groups of 
tufted capuchins (Cebus apella). American Journal of Primatology, 43, 33-41. 
Wynn, K. (1992). Addition and subtraction by human infants. Nature, 358, 749-750.  
 
 
Evoluirana psihološka struktura za podjelu,  





Istraživanja su pokazala da djeca i prije početka formalnoga obrazovanja mogu rješavati 
zahtjevne matematičke zadatke dijeljenja. To se potvrđuje i prilikom rješavanja matematičkih 
problemskih zadataka razmjene pomoću postupka nazvanoga "podjela". Teorija prikazana u 
ovome radu pretpostavlja da dječja sposobnost rješavanja takvih problema proizlazi iz evoluirane 
psihološke strukture odgovorne za postupak podjele. Ta je struktura mogla biti oblikovana 
ekološkim uvjetima koji su tijekom evolucijske prošlosti kod naših predaka doveli do 
kooperativnoga dijeljenja hrane, što je pridonijelo nastanku sposobnosti matematičkoga dijeljenja. 
U prilog teoriji ide postojanje specijaliziranoga postupka podjele prilikom rješavanja problemskih 
zadataka razmjene, kulturalno univerzalna dječja sposobnost rješavanja takvih problema, izostanak 
svjesnosti prilikom rješavanja takvih problema, razvoj od podjele do mentalnoga modela, zatim 
evidencija o postojanju evoluiranih kvantitativnih sposobnosti kod ljudi i životinja, postupci 
razmjene hrane kod majmuna kapucina te sposobnost ravnopravne podjele. U raspravi je prikazan 
moguć scenarij razvoja opisane evoluirane strukture, ilustrirano je kako struktura može biti 
iskorištena prilikom osnovnoškolskoga poučavanja te su navedena empirijska pitanja koja mogu 
usmjeriti daljnja istraživanja s ciljem boljega razumijevanja postupaka dijeljenja hrane, ekologije i 
sociologije naših predaka. 
 
Ključne riječi: matematičko dijeljenje, evaluirana psihološka struktura, razmjena hrane, 
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